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    oreign terrorist fighters” are high on the agenda of the international 
community. This is illustrated by the adoption in 2014 of Resolution 2178 
by the United Nations Security Council in which the Council expressed 
grave concern over the “acute and growing threat posed by foreign terror-
ist fighters,”1 and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, obliged mem-
ber States to take a number of measures to address the threat presented by 
such fighters. The international community’s focus has primarily been on 
individuals present in, or intending to travel to, Syria and Iraq to join ter-
rorist groups since it is armed groups in these two States that attract the 
most fighters.   
The fight against foreign terrorist fighters takes a wide range of forms, 
including preventive measures to counter violent extremism and address 
the conditions conducive to terrorism, military force, intelligence opera-
tions and law enforcement actions. It is also a fight in which States choose 
their own approach. This choice is influenced by many different factors; 
one of which is whether the State concerned is primarily a “sending” State 
or a “receiving” State.   
This article examines the approach taken by the Netherlands, as a send-
ing State, predominantly in the context of the Syrian conflict.2 In April 
2016, the government reported that approximately 240 individuals had 
traveled from the Netherlands to Iraq and/or Syria, and that around forty 
had returned to the Netherlands.3 The government has stated that those 
who have returned constitute a potential threat, although this has not been 
the case for the majority of individuals who have returned to date.4 
As a consequence of this concern, in August 2014, the Dutch govern-
ment presented an Action Program for Addressing Jihadism in an Integrat-
ed Way5 in which it set out thirty-eight measures to combat jihadism. The 
program included the introduction of new measures, enhancement of exist-
                                                                                                                      
1. S.C. Res. 2178, pmbl. ¶ 8 (Sept. 24, 2014). 
2. “Conflict” is used here as shorthand. Arguably, there are two or even several armed 
conflicts ongoing in Syria. 
3. Parliamentary Papers II, 34356 (R2064), No. 6, Apr. 1, 2016, at 9. 
4. Id. at 7. 
5. Parliamentary Papers II, 29754, No. 253, Aug. 29, 2014. English translation available 
at https://english.nctv.nl/Images/def-a5-nctvjihadismuk-03-lr_tcm92-562673.pdf [here-












ing measures and the continuation of some measures already in place. 
Many of these measures address in whole or in part foreign terrorist fight-
ers. This article considers those measures that have raised, or that may 
raise, questions of international law, primarily those measures undertaken 
in the field of law enforcement. For present purposes, law enforcement is 
understood in a broad sense as including measures taken on the basis of 
domestic criminal and administrative law.  
At first sight, law enforcement measures appear to be regulated princi-
pally by domestic law and therefore international law might seem less rele-
vant. It will be seen, however, that law enforcement measures raise im-
portant questions of international law that bear on the application and in-
terpretation of domestic law. At this interface of domestic and international 
law, a number of challenges arise for the sending State. The measures that 
will be discussed concern criminal prosecution (Section II), freezing assets 
(Section III), deprivation of nationality (Section IV) and revoking travel 
documents (Section V).   
This article will not deal with the use of military force or intelligence 
operations. However, to the degree that intelligence operations provide 
important information that may be used for the purpose of justifying a 
number of the law enforcement measures, the linkage between the two will 
be discussed in the context of the specific measures addressed. 
As a preliminary matter before dealing with the specific measures, it is 
important to define the term “foreign terrorist fighter” and to distinguish it 
from a second term, “foreign fighter,” which is often used in international 
discourse. No single authoritative definition exists for either, although for-
eign fighter is viewed as the more general of the two. A UN Human Rights 
Council working group defined foreign fighter as “generally understood to 
refer to individuals who leave their country of origin or habitual residence 
and become involved in violence as part of an insurgency or non-State 
armed group in an armed conflict. Foreign fighters are motivated by a 
range of factors, notably ideology.”6  
Resolution 2178 defines foreign terrorist fighters as “individuals who 
travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the 
purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation 
in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including 
                                                                                                                      
6. Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating 
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, 













in connection with armed conflict.”7 The definition of “terrorism” or “ter-
rorist” is notoriously controversial and introduces a measure of definitional 
uncertainty.8 Resolution 2178 does not include a definition of terrorism,9 
appearing to leave it to the discretion of the member States. This aspect of 
the resolution has led to sharp criticism from commentators who argue 
that the lack of a definition increases the possibilities for abuse.10 
In the Netherlands, at least in a domestic context, neither foreign fight-
er nor foreign terrorist fighter is used. The more frequently used terms are 
“jihad-goer” or, more specifically, “Syria-goer.” Just as with foreign fighter 
and foreign terrorist fighter, there is no single authoritative definition of 
these terms. The internal security service of the Netherlands, the General 
Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheids-
dienst, or AIVD), defines a jihad-goer as “an individual who, with jihadist 
intentions, leaves the Netherlands in an attempt to reach conflict areas 
where jihadist groups are active.”11 On one hand, this definition is arguably 
broader than foreign terrorist fighters as defined in Resolution 2178, be-
cause instead of referring specifically to terrorist acts or terrorist training, it 
merely refers to jihadist intentions. On the other hand, because the term is 
specifically linked to jihad rather than terrorism more broadly regardless of 
motivation, it can be interpreted more narrowly than foreign terrorist fight-
ers. Given that the issues to be examined deal specifically with individuals 
in Syria, for practical purposes the difference in terminology does not ap-
pear significant, therefore, foreign terrorist fighter, the more widely used 
term, will be used.  
 
II. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
 
Criminal prosecution is an important tool in combating foreign terrorist 
fighters. In recent years the Netherlands has been very active in pursuing 
prosecution; indeed, the initiation of a criminal investigation when a for-
eign terrorist fighter is identified is the first measure referred to in the gov-
                                                                                                                      
7. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶ 8. 
8. See e.g., BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). 
9. It may be noted that the Council included a “working definition” or terrorism in 
Resolution 1566. S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3 (Oct. 8, 2004). Resolution 2178 does not expressly 
refer to that resolution, however. 
10. See e.g., Martin Scheinin, Back to Post 9-11 Panic? Security Council Resolution on Foreign 
Terrorist Fighters, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/15407/po 
st-911-panic-security-council-resolution-foreign-terrorist-fighters-scheinin/. 












ernment’s action program.12 In March 2016 there were 115 ongoing inves-
tigations concerning approximately 135 persons related to violent ji-
hadism.13 A limited number of cases have proceeded to trial so far,14 with 
the first judgment on jihadism occurring in October 2013.15  
Prosecution may take place either for common crimes such as murder, 
manslaughter and arson, or for specific terrorism-related offenses. A num-
ber of such offenses were introduced into the Dutch Criminal Code 
through the 2004 Terrorist Crimes Act,16 which was enacted in response to 
the Council of Europe’s Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of 
June 13, 2002 (EU Framework Decision).17 It required, inter alia, European 
Union (EU) members to define certain acts, as well as acts related to terror-
ist groups and terrorist-linked offenses, as crimes under their domestic leg-
islation and to ensure the offenses were “punishable by effective, propor-
tionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.”18   
One of the elements introduced by the Terrorist Crimes Act was the 
notion of “terrorist intent,” which was inserted in the Criminal Code as 
Article 83a. Such intent is defined as “the intention of instilling profound 
fear in (part of) a country’s population, unlawfully forcing a government to 
do, refrain from doing or tolerate something, or seriously disrupting or de-
stroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social struc-
tures of a country or international organisation.”19 Article 83(1) lists those 
crimes which, if committed with terrorist intent, constitute a terrorist 
crime.  
In 2009, passage of the Act Concerning Training for Terrorism20 added 
                                                                                                                      
12. Parliamentary Papers II, 29754, No. 253, supra note 5, annex, at 5. 
13. Parliamentary Papers 2015–2016, 29754, No. 363, at 2. 
14. Parliamentary Papers 2015–2016, 29754, No. 326, annex, at 2.  
15. Rechtbank Rotterdam [District Court of Rotterdam], No. 10/960233-12 
(ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:8265), Oct. 23, 2013, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inzien 
document?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:8265.  
16. Wet Terroristische Misdrijven, 24 juni 2004, Stb. 2004, 290 [hereinafter 2004 
Terrorist Crimes Act]. This act inserted certain articles into the Wetboek van Strafrecht 
[hereinafter Dutch Criminal Code]. 
17. Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 2002/475/JHA, 2002, 
O.J. (L 164) 3 (EU) [hereinafter EU Council Framework Decision]. 
18. Id. art. 5. 
19.  2004 Terrorist Crimes Act, supra note 16, at D.  
20. Wet van 12 juni 2009 tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht, Wetboek van 
Strafvordering en enkele aanverwante wetten in verband met de strafbaarstelling van het 
deelnemen en meewerken aan training voor terrorisme, uitbreiding van de mogelijkheden 













Article 134a to the Criminal Code. This constituted the domestic imple-
mentation of Article 7 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Pre-
vention of Terrorism.21 In 2013, Article 421 criminalizing the financing of 
terrorism was inserted into the Criminal Code. 
 
A. The Relationship between Terrorist Offenses and International Humanitarian Law 
 
One of the most interesting questions that has arisen in the case law based 
on prosecutions for these offenses is the relationship between terrorist 
crimes and international humanitarian law (IHL). In several cases the ac-
cused have argued that the application of IHL precluded their conviction 
for terrorist offenses.  
In the Maher H. case, for instance, an individual was prosecuted for 
terrorist offenses committed while in Syria after his return to the Nether-
lands.22 He argued there was an ongoing non-international armed conflict 
in Syria and that as a result the provisions in Dutch criminal law on terror-
ism were inapplicable. He alleged that if it could be proven that he partici-
pated in an armed conflict, he would benefit from the protections of the 
Geneva Conventions, which meant that he could only be prosecuted for 
war crimes.23 It appears the accused was claiming a form of combatant 
                                                                                                                      
Training voor Terrorisme), 18 juni 2009, Stb. 2009, 245 (Act Concerning Training for 
Terrorism).  
21. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, 
C.E.T.S. 196 [hereinafter Council Terrorist Convention]. It may be noted that while the 
Convention defines training for terrorism only as providing instruction in certain fields (id. 
art. 7), the 2004 Terrorist Crimes Act made receipt of training a criminal offense (2004 
Terrorist Crimes Act, supra note 16, art. 1(G)). On October 22, 2015, an Additional Proto-
col to the Convention was adopted that also requires the criminalization of receiving ter-
rorist training. Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Preven-
tion of Terrorism, art. 3, Oct. 22, 2015, C.E.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Additional Protocol to 
Council Terrorist Convention].  
22. Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage [District Court of The Hague], No. 09/767116-14 
(ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:14652), Dec. 1, 2014, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inzien 
document?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2014:14652 [hereinafter Maher H.].  
23. Id. ¶ 3. For the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol, see Conven-
tion (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 













Combatant immunity protects lawful combatants from punishment 
under domestic law for committing lawful acts of war, i.e., acts not in viola-
tion of IHL.24 Although the term “combatant immunity” does not appear 
in IHL instruments, it is a basic principle underpinning that body of law. It 
is almost unanimously accepted, however, that combatant immunity only 
applies in international armed conflicts, not in non-international armed 
conflicts.25 This was the reasoning followed by the district court in rejecting 
the accused’s claim.26 The court, after finding that there was a non-
international armed conflict in Syria, held that it followed from Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II27 and case law28 that  
members of an organized armed group—in contrast to members of State 
armed forces—are not authorized to use force in a non-international armed 
conflict.29 According to the court, this was also the view of authoritative 
commentators. It concluded that civilians who take a direct part in hostili-
ties in a non-international armed conflict do not enjoy a status comparable 
to combatant immunity; consequently, they can be criminally prosecuted 
for their participation in hostilities.  
The court went on to state that in a non-international armed conflict, 
IHL is not the only applicable law, and in doing so referred to a 2014 
judgment of the General Court of the European Union.30 The General 
                                                                                                                      
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
24. SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CON-
FLICT 514 (2012). 
25. Id.; Waldemar Solf, The Status of Combatants in Non-international Armed Conflicts under 
Domestic Law and Transnational Practice, 33 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 53, 57–59 
(2011). 
26. Maher H., supra note 22, ¶ 3. 
27.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609. 
28. Maher H., supra note 22, ¶ 3 (citing Case T-208/11 and T-508/11,16, LTTE v. 
Council (Oct. 16, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&do 
cid=158631&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=27
177 [hereinafter 2014 LTTE case]).   
29. Id.  
30. The General Court is one of the constituent parts of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. See Treaty on European Union, art. 19, Oct. 26, 2012, O.J. (C 326). The 
General Court rules on actions for annulment brought by individuals, companies and, in 













Court dealt with a request by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
to annul regulations implementing EU legislation under which the LTTE 
had been placed on a European sanctions list.31 The LTTE submitted that 
the EU legislation concerned was not applicable to situations of armed 
conflict, since those conflicts—and therefore the acts committed during 
those conflicts—could only be governed by IHL. 
According to the LTTE, it was  
 
involved in armed conflict against the armed forces of the government of 
Sri Lanka, seeking self-determination for the Tamil people and their “lib-
eration from the oppression” of that government. Given the way in 
which the LTTE’s armed forces were organized and their manner of 
conducting operations, the members of those forces meet all the re-
quirements laid down by international law for recognition of the mem-
bers of those forces as “combatants.” That status gave them immunity in 
respect of acts of war that were lawful under the terms of the law on 
armed conflict and meant that, in the case of unlawful acts, the LTTE 
would be subject only to that law, and not to any anti-terrorism legisla-
tion.32 
 
This argument was rejected by the General Court. The Court held that 
“contrary to what the LTTE claims, the applicability of international hu-
manitarian law to a situation of armed conflict and to acts committed in 
that context does not imply that legislation on terrorism does not apply to 
those acts.”33 
The district court in the Maher H. case followed a similar line of rea-
soning in reaching its conclusion. The judgment held that the fact that vio-
lations of IHL in non-international armed conflicts have been criminalized 
as war crimes under Dutch criminal law, does not preclude these acts from 
also being punishable as common crimes, nor does it mean that other acts 
committed in the context of a non-international armed conflict cannot be 
punishable under common criminal law. 
This may seem an obvious conclusion; however, in an earlier case a 
variation of the argument put forward by the accused had been success-
ful.34 That case concerned individuals accused of collecting funds for the 
                                                                                                                      
31. 2014 LTTE case, supra note 28.  
32. Id. ¶¶ 42–43. 
33. Id. ¶ 56. For the reasoning of the Court on this point, see ¶¶ 54–83.  
34. Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage [District Court of The Hague], No. 09/748801-09 












LTTE. They were prosecuted for, inter alia, the crime of participation in the 
activities of an organization whose objective was the commission of terror-
ist offenses. As with the crimes in the Maher H. case, the charge was based 
on the EU Framework Decision.35  
In reaching its decision, the court addressed the question of whether 
the LTTE was an armed force within the meaning of the Framework Deci-
sion. Paragraph 11 of that decision provides: 
   
Actions by armed forces during periods of armed conflict, which are gov-
erned by international humanitarian law within the meaning of these 
terms under that law, and, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules 
of international law, actions by the armed forces of a State in the exercise 
of their official duties are not governed by this Framework Decision.36 
 
This paragraph reflects wording similar to that found in a number of ter-
rorism conventions. For example, Article 19(2) of the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention provides: 
 
The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms 
are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed 
by that law, are not governed by this Convention, and the activities un-
dertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official du-
ties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law, are 
not governed by this Convention.37 
 
Article 6(2) of the Beijing Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts relating to International Civil Aviation38 contains identical wording, as 
does Article 4(2) of the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism39 and Article 26(5) of the Council of Europe 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.40 
The district court found the forces of the LTTE were comparable to 
                                                                                                                      
document?id=ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BT8829 [hereinafter 2011 LTTE case].   
35. EU Council Framework Decision, supra note 17, art. 2(b). 
36. Id. pmbl. ¶ 11. 
37. International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings art. 19(2), 
Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S 256. 
38. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International Civil 
Aviation art. 6(2), Sept. 10, 2010, 974 U.N.T.S. 178. 
39. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism art. 
4(2), Apr. 13, 2005, 2445 U.N.T.S. 89. 













State armed forces, and that there was a non-international armed conflict 
between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka.41 It determined that 
since all the acts of the accused referred to by the prosecution were con-
nected to the armed conflict, it could not convict the accused of participat-
ing in an organization whose purpose was the commission of terrorist of-
fenses. The court implied that since the acts concerned were in its view 
outside the scope of the Framework Decision, they were also outside of 
the scope of the offense found in the legislation implemented into Dutch 
domestic criminal law. 
On appeal, the district court’s findings on this issue were reversed.42 
The court of appeal held that the LTTE was an organized armed group 
engaged in an armed conflict,43 and then addressed the question of whether 
Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I was applicable.44 It concluded the situ-
ation failed to meet the criteria of Article 1(4), but that there was, instead, a 
non-international armed conflict between the LTTE and Sri Lanka.45 Final-
ly, the court held that members of an organized armed group in a non-
international armed conflict do not enjoy combatant status, characterizing 
them as “unprivileged belligerents” who could be prosecuted under domes-
tic criminal law for their actions during the conflict.46  
The court of appeal’s reasoning was followed by the district court of 
The Hague in its judgment of December 10, 2015 in the so-called “Con-
text” case.47 This case concerned nine accused who were charged with be-
longing to a group recruiting individuals to fight for the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and Jahbat Al-Nusra in Syria. One of the argu-
ments put forward by the defense was that there was an international 
armed conflict in Syria and Iraq, or at least some areas of those States.48 
The defense claimed that many States supported insurgent groups, and that 
there was strong evidence indicating such assistance went beyond mere fi-
                                                                                                                      
41. 2011 LTTE case, supra note 34,   
42. Gerechtshof Den Haag [Court of Appeal of The Hague], No. 22-005123-11 
(ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:1082), Apr. 30, 2015,  http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inzien 
document?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:1082. 
43. Id. § 10.4.1.  
44. Id. § 10.4.3. 
45. Id. § 10.4.2.3.4. 
46. Id. § 10.4.3.3.2. 
47. Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage [District Court of The Hague]   (ECLI:NL:RBDHA:201 
5:14365), Dec. 10, 2015, http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL 
:RBDHA:2015:14365 [hereinafter Context case]. 












nancial or logistic support. It alleged that, in fact, some States exercised 
“overall control” over certain groups, thus internationalizing the conflict.49 
Because combatants in an international armed conflict enjoy combatant 
immunity the defense considered that the Netherlands did not have juris-
diction over the alleged facts.50  
The court held that the armed conflict in Syria was a non-international 
armed conflict, finding insufficient evidence to conclude that the conflict 
had been internationalized.51 The court then stated that in a non-
international armed conflict, the application of IHL does not exclude the 
application of other fields of law; a finding it indicated is supported in 
abundant case law and literature.52 According to the court, it followed that 
acts of violence committed during a non-international armed conflict can 
be crimes under both IHL and domestic law.53 
The court went on to find that in non-international armed conflicts 
members of armed groups have no combatant status. In reaching this con-
clusion it reviewed the drafting history of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
which indicated States were unwilling to grant combatant immunity to 
members of organized armed groups with which they were in conflict, be-
cause of their desire to prevent citizens taking justice in their own hands.54 
Thus, it held that members of organized armed groups are criminally re-
sponsible both for common crimes such as murder and violations of 
IHL.55   
The defense raised the issue of the meaning to be given to the provi-
sion excluding armed forces from the Framework Decision; specifically, 
whether paragraph 11 precludes the application of the terrorist offenses in 
Dutch criminal law to conduct occurring during armed conflicts.56 The 
court held that it needed to establish the meaning of armed forces as used 
in the Framework Decision to answer this question.57 It considered that the 
term clearly encompasses the armed forces of a State, but that non-State 
armed groups are usually referred to as “organized armed groups,” rather 
                                                                                                                      
49. Id. ¶ 7.4. 
50. Id. ¶ 7.20. 
51. Id. ¶¶ 7.5–7.13. 
52. Id. ¶ 7.17. 
53. Id. ¶ 7.18. 
54. Id. ¶ 7.23.  
55. Id. ¶¶ 7.22–7.23. 
56. Id. ¶ 7.34. 













than “armed forces.”58 The court then looked at the government’s interpre-
tation, observing that although paragraph 11 had not been addressed in 
discussions between the government and parliament as the Framework 
Decision was being implemented, a comparable provision—Article 19(2) 
of the Terrorist Bombing Convention—was discussed. In that debate, the 
Minister of Justice defined armed forces as the “armed forces of a State,” 
but did acknowledge that different interpretations were inevitable.59  
The court also considered that in interpreting paragraph 11, the object 
and purpose of IHL and of the paragraph needed to be taken into ac-
count.60 It noted that the Framework Decision was one of a number of in-
struments adopted by the international community in response to the glob-
al threat of terrorist groups61 and that the purpose of these instruments—
the prosecution of suspected terrorists before domestic courts on the basis 
of domestic terrorism legislation—was of great importance. It found that 
interpreting the exclusion clause in a way that would make it impossible to 
prosecute suspected terrorists for their terrorist acts because these were 
committed during an armed conflict, would be unreasonable.62  
The court ultimately reached two important conclusions. First, that it 
was clear that the term “armed forces” as it appears in the Framework De-
cision encompassed only the armed forces of a State. Second, that mem-
bers of organized armed groups do not enjoy combatant status and can be 
prosecuted under both IHL and domestic law.63 Thus it did not consider 
that any conflict existed between the two regimes. 
The attempts by the Dutch courts to clarify the relationship between 
IHL and counterterrorism instruments, and the meaning of exclusion 
clauses in the latter, are a welcome development in addressing issues that 
have created confusion. As the Minister of Justice stated, the exclusion 
clauses in counterterrorism instruments are formulated in a way that leaves 
room for interpretation.64  
This ambiguity has led to divergent opinions, particularly in how the 
term “armed forces” is interpreted. There is some support for the view that 
                                                                                                                      
58. Id. ¶ 7.40. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. ¶ 7.41. 
61. Id. ¶ 7.42. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. ¶ 7.44. 
64. See, e.g., Claudia Martin, Terrorism as a Crime in International and Domestic Law: Open 
issues, in COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 












organized armed groups fall under the category of the armed forces.65 This 
interpretation could contribute to achieving certain policy objectives. First, 
it could provide an incentive for members of armed groups to respect IHL, 
as long as the exclusion of members of organized armed groups from the 
scope of application of counterterrorism conventions is limited to acts that 
are not prohibited under IHL. Second, each of the counterterrorism con-
ventions typically requires a State to either prosecute or extradite individu-
als who commit an offense within the meaning of the convention. By in-
cluding members of armed groups in the exclusion clause, third States 
would have discretion in deciding whether or not to prosecute them for 
acts committed during an armed conflict, insofar as they do not amount to 
international crimes, and would not be required to grant extradition re-
quests. Some believe this would be consistent with the recommendation 
found in Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II to “endeavour to grant the 
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed 
conflict.”66 
Notwithstanding these possible advantages for including organized 
armed groups within the definition of armed forces, the majority view is 
that armed forces in the exclusion clauses of counterterrorism instruments 
refers exclusively to State armed forces.67 This interpretation is certainly the 
one most consistent with IHL and its classification of the legal status of 
members of organized armed groups. As the discussion by the Dutch 
courts demonstrates, the interpretation of exclusion clauses in counterter-
rorism instruments is closely related to the status of members of organized 
armed groups in non-international armed conflicts. It is widely accepted 
                                                                                                                      
65. See, e.g., Andrea Gioia, The UN Conventions on the Prevention and Suppression of Interna-
tional Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE UNIT-
ED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 3, at 
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that IHL does not grant combatant immunity to members of organized 
armed groups, except in those rare cases in which AP I, Article 1(4) ap-
plies.68 This was correctly concluded by the Dutch courts, but this is not to 
say that there is no debate on this issue.69  
 
B. Incitement and the Freedom of Expression 
 
Incitement to commit terrorist offenses has played an increasingly im-
portant role in the criminal prosecution of foreign terrorist fighters in the 
Netherlands.70 Incitement is criminalized in Article 131 of the Criminal 
Code; Article 132 criminalizes the distribution of inciting texts or images. 
Both articles increase the maximum penalty if the offense that is incited is a 
terrorist offense. Under Dutch criminal law, for incitement to be proven a 
direct connection is required between the incitement and the criminal of-
fense that is the object of the incitement.71 Incitement can take place direct-
ly or indirectly, but must be done publicly. Dutch courts have found that 
the Internet is a public place, provided the general public has access to the 
Internet page concerned.72 Case law has made clear that incitement can take 
the form of a request or urging, but can also be an expression of high mor-
al appreciation for an act.73 
Prosecution for incitement raises the question of the relationship be-
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tween this offense on the one hand and the freedom of expression on the 
other hand. The latter is enshrined in Article 6 of the Constitution of the 
Netherlands.74 It is also set out in Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which provides:  
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall in-
clude freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of fron-
tiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions 
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic so-
ciety, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or 
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.75 
 
It follows from Article 10(2) that restrictions on the freedom of expression 
are permissible only if three criteria are met. First, the interference must be 
prescribed by law. Second, it must be aimed at one or more of the listed 
interests or values. Finally, the interference must be necessary in a demo-
cratic society. The adjective necessary within the meaning of Article 10(2) 
implies the existence of a “pressing social need.”76 In determining whether 
there is a pressing social need, a national court must decide whether the 
interference was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and whether 
the reasons cited by national authorities to justify it are relevant and suffi-
cient.77 The aims referred to are the particular interests or values from the 
exhaustive list in Article 10(2) that are invoked by the government to justify 
its interference. 
The relationship between freedom of expression and incitement was 
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considered by the district court of The Hague in the case of Maher H.78 In 
this case, the accused had, inter alia, distributed jihadist You Tube videos 
through Whatsapp, and posted a picture of himself with a Kalashnikov and 
photos of ISIL flags on his Facebook page. The defense argued, inter alia, 
that these expressions did not go beyond what was allowed under the free-
dom of expression provided by Article 10(1).79 In rejecting this argument, 
the court invoked ECHR, Article 17,80 which provides that  
 
[n]othing in th[e] Convention may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any 
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth 
[in the Convention] or at their limitation to a greater extent than provided 
for in the Convention.  
 
On this basis, the court considered that the freedom of expression does 
not offer a safe haven for those who incite to terrorist offences.81 
Incitement was also charged in the Context case.82 Six of the accused 
were charged with incitement to commit terrorist offenses, specifically to 
take part in armed jihad in Syria. The accused used a wide variety of media, 
including a website, a digital radio channel, YouTube, Twitter and Face-
book, and public demonstrations. The court applied the ECHR Article 
10(2) criteria finding that the criminalization of incitement was prescribed 
by law and that its purpose was to prevent the commission of criminal of-
fenses, and was, therefore, a legitimate infringement on the freedom of ex-
pression. 
As to the question of whether the interference with the freedom of ex-
pression was necessary in a democratic society, the judgment contains an 
extensive discussion of the acts charged as incitement in which the court 
took into account the content of the media and public statements, the con-
text in which they were made, the places or occasions they occurred, the 
audience and their apparent objective.83 Although an in depth analysis of 
this discussion is beyond the ambit of this article, it is interesting to note 
that the court held that the direct connection between a number of the 
statements and rousing others to participate in armed jihad in Syria was 
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lacking. This was the case, inter alia, for the mere display of flags used by 
ISIS,84 and also for two lectures concerning historic texts by Anwar Al-
Awlaki. The latter were broadcast on a radio channel and made no refer-
ence to the contemporary situation in Syria.85  
This was not the case, however, for a broadcast lecture by one of the 
accused in which he, inter alia, begged for victory by ISIS and Al-Nusra, 
and condemned foreign terrorist fighters who had returned from Syria after 
only several weeks.86 Taking into account the nature of the lecture, the ra-
dio channel on which it was broadcast and the audience, as well as the con-
text in which it was delivered, the court considered that the apparent inten-
tion was to imprint on listeners that traveling to Syria to take part in armed 
jihad was desirable.87  
The court held that a number of the statements could be regarded as 
glorification of, or propaganda for, armed violence, but not as incitement.88 
The court noted that the former is not a criminal offence in the Nether-
lands and that propaganda in principle does not fall within the definition of 
incitement.89 The accused were therefore acquitted of incitement with re-
spect to these statements.90  
Of particular interest are the remarks by the court concerning the fleet-
ing nature of messages on social media such as Twitter and Facebook. The 
defense of some of the accused stressed this character of social media. It 
argued that messages placed on Twitter or Facebook could not easily be 
regarded as indirect incitement, because the context surrounding them is 
lacking. The messages are usually short, often accompanied by a picture or 
hyperlink, un-nuanced and lack analysis. Further, it was argued, the mes-
sages are consumed quickly, often after superficial reading.   
In addressing the defense’s arguments, the court considered that while 
these characteristics may, on the one hand, reduce the impact left by the 
message, on the other hand, it places a larger responsibility on the sender. 
This is because the first message seen is the one that will be remembered.91 
In other words, the court does not appear to have considered the fleeting 
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nature of social media as a reason to be more lenient in determining 
whether incitement has occurred. The court maintained that there is a re-
sponsibility on the part of the sender to consider what his/her message will 
convey when read superficially. It took this responsibility into account in its 
analysis of specific statements.92 All six of the accused were convicted of 
incitement; for one it was the only offense for which he was convicted.93 
He was given a prison sentence of seven days. 
 
C. Terrorist Intent 
 
As indicated above, the Dutch Criminal Code provides that certain crimes, 
if committed with terrorist intent, constitute a terrorist crime, with a result-
ant increase in the maximum penalty for these crimes. Article 83a of the 
Criminal Code defines terrorist intent as “the intention of instilling pro-
found fear in (part of) a country’s population, unlawfully forcing a gov-
ernment to do, refrain from doing or tolerate something, or seriously dis-
rupting or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or 
social structures of a country or international organisation.”94 This defini-
tion is based on the EU Framework Decision.95  
The interpretation of terrorist intent was at issue in two  cases decided 
by the district court of Gelderland in February 2015.96 The cases concerned 
two men who were arrested in Germany in rental cars with large sums of 
money and bags filled with, inter alia, combat gear, balaclavas, combat gog-
gles and iPhones. There were indications that the brother of one of them 
was fighting in Syria. Among the offenses charged was conspiracy to com-
mit murder, aggravated assault and arson, all with terrorist intent. This re-
quired the court to analyze what constitutes terrorist intent. It held that the 
necessary intent cannot be deduced solely from the ideology of an accused 
and that to find terrorist intent there must be objective evidence of its 
presence. However, in determining whether such evidence existed, the 
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thoughts and ideology of the accused could be taken into account.97 In the 
case at hand because it was unclear whether the accused intended to travel 
to Syria and if so, for what purpose, neither the alleged acts nor terrorist 
intent could be proven.98 
Another case in which terrorist intent was at issue was decided by the 
district court of Rotterdam in June 2015.99 This case concerned a returned 
foreign terrorist fighter who was planning a robbery to generate funds for 
jihad. The court concluded relatively easily that there was terrorist intent as 
the proceeds of the robbery were to go to jihadist groups known to com-
mit large-scale human rights abuses in Syria. This, according to the court, 
was sufficient evidence for a finding of terrorist intent. 
The courts thus have made a distinction between terrorist intent and 
ideological motive, but have held that motive can nevertheless play a role in 
establishing terrorist intent. This will ease the prosecution’s burden in es-
tablishing intent in cases where the accused is an adherent of an ideology 
that encourages violence.100  
 
III. ASSET FREEZES 
 
Another instrument that the Netherlands employs to combat foreign ter-
rorist fighters is that of sanctions. Sanctions include travel bans and asset 
freezes. Travel bans are implemented via the non-issuance of a visa (to 
non-national foreign terrorist fighters) and the revocation of passports (for 
Dutch nationals).101 The section focuses on asset freezes.   
The UN Security Council has imposed two asset freezes directly rele-
vant to addressing the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters present in 
Syria and Iraq. In Resolution 1373, the Council imposed an asset freeze on 
persons and entities involved in committing or facilitating terrorism.102 In 
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Resolution 1267 and subsequent resolutions, particularly Resolution 1989, 
it imposed an asset freeze specifically on Al-Qaida and other individuals, 
groups, undertakings and entities associated with it.103 In Resolution 2253, 
the Council restated that asset freezes imposed in earlier resolutions apply 
to ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and en-
tities.104 In the case of the Netherlands, these regimes have been imple-
mented through EU regulation. The general regime based on Resolution 
1373 has been implemented through Common Positions 
2001/930/CFSP105 and 2001/931/CFSP,106 together with Regulation 
2580/2001107 and subsequent regulations.108 The Al-Qaida asset freeze has 
been implemented through EU Regulation 881/2002.109 Based on this leg-
islation the EU maintains lists of persons and entities to which the asset 
freezes apply.110  
In the case of the asset freeze based on Resolution 1373, States list per-
sons and entities to which the freeze applies on a national basis, in addition 
to the list maintained by the EU. The legal basis under national law in the 
Netherlands for doing so is the Sanctions Law of 1977, which authorizes 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs to promulgate ministerial regulations to im-
plement international obligations.111 Issued under this authority, Sanctions 
Regulation Terrorism 2007-II gives the Minister the authority to freeze the 
assets of any person or organization which, he, with the agreement of the 
Minister of Security and Justice and the Minister of Finance, determines 
fulfills the criteria set forth in Resolution 1373.112 Imposing such an asset 
                                                                                                                      
entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including 
funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by 
such persons and associated persons and entities.”). 
103. S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1989, ¶ 1(a) (June 17, 2011).  
104. S.C. Res. 2253, ¶ 2(a) (Dec, 17, 2015). 
105. Council Common Position (EC) No. 2001/930/CFSP of 27 December 2001, 
2001 O.J. (L 344) 90.  
106. Council Common Position (EC) No. 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001, 
2001 O.J. (L 344) 93. 
107. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001, O.J. (L 344) 70.  
108. Including Commission Regulation (EC) No. 745/2003 of 28 April 2003, O.J. 
(L106) 22; Council Regulation (EC) No. 1791/2006 of 1 January 2007, O.J. (L363) 1. 
109. Council Regulation (EC) No. 881/2001 of 27 May 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 139) 9. 
110. European Union, Consolidated List of Persons, Groups and Entities Subject to 
EU Financial Sanctions, http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/consol-list/index_en.htm 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2016).  
111. Sanctiewet 1977 van 15 februari 1980, Stb. 1980, 93.  












freeze is done by means of an administrative decision (aanwijzingsbesluit) 
that, in addition to freezing the assets of the person or organization, pro-
hibits others from conducting financial services for, or in the interest of, or 
providing assets to such a person or organization.113 
Between 2002 and January 2016, sixty-four asset freezes had been im-
posed on fifty-six individuals and on seven organizations (one organization 
twice) as a consequence of this Regulation.114 When considering whether an 
individual or organization should be added to the listing, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs will convene a so-called “asset freeze meeting” (bevriezing-
soverleg), bringing together representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Security and Justice, the Pub-
lic Prosecution Service and the AIVD. Circumstances that may result in a 
listing include the initiation of a criminal investigation; prosecution for 
commission of, attempted commission of, complicity in or facilitation of a 
terrorist act; and conviction of such crime. Additionally, a listing may be 
initiated on the basis of an AIVD official report providing credible infor-
mation of involvement of a person or organization in a terrorist act, at-
tempted commission of such an act or complicity in, or facilitation of, such 
an act. In instances where a listing is being considered on the basis of an 
AIVD official report or an investigation or prosecution by the public pros-
ecutor, the information underlying the report, investigation or prosecution 
must be examined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to determine 
whether it provides sufficient support for a listing. The decision to list a 
person or organization is ultimately made by the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance and the Minister of 
Security and Justice. It is then published in the government gazette (Staats-
courant), and communicated in writing to the person or organization con-
cerned, including the grounds for the listing in so far as practically possible. 
An administrative objection to the decision may be submitted to the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs and, if unsuccessful, it may be appealed to the ad-
ministrative courts.  
Assets freezes related to Syria have not been judicially challenged to 
date. Challenges to other listings, however, provide insight into the stand-
ards courts would apply. Particularly illustrative is an April 2015 judgment 
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by the district court of Amsterdam.115 This case concerned the listing of 
three persons under Sanctions Regulation Terrorism 2007-II. They had 
been extradited to Belgium and convicted there for recruiting persons and 
raising funds for jihad in Chechnya.116 Asset freezes were subsequently im-
posed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the basis of their conviction in 
Belgium.117 After their administrative objection was rejected by the minis-
ter, they appealed the decision to the administrative chamber of the district 
court of Amsterdam. They argued, inter alia, that there was insufficient in-
formation to support the listing, which was based solely on the Belgian 
judgment (which in the meantime had been overturned by the Belgian 
Court of Cassation on procedural grounds).118  
In reaching its decision, the court indicated that an asset freeze has se-
rious consequences for the person being listed. For this reason, it held the 
minister in considering a listing has a far-reaching, proactive responsibility 
to obtain the information on which to base a decision, and the results of 
that information-gathering exercise must be described with sufficient clarity 
in the decision to list. The court found that the mere reference to the Bel-
gian judgment did not meet this standard and revoked the listing.  
This judgment illustrates that the factual information underlying a list-
ing must meet certain minimum standards. These standards may be diffi-
cult to meet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is largely dependent on the 
intelligence services and the Public Prosecution Service to gather infor-
mation. The former may be reluctant to provide information out of con-
cern that it will become public. Moreover, even if the intelligence service or 
Public Prosecution Service is willing to obtain the necessary information, 
doing so may be difficult, particularly if the person concerned is in Syria.   
Another challenge posed by listings is how to reconcile them with the 
goal of deradicalizing foreign terrorist fighters and reintegrating them into 
society. These are important objectives of counterterrorism efforts and 
freezing assets may be counterproductive to achieving these objectives in 
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certain circumstances.119  
 
IV. DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY 
 
The Dutch government has identified revoking the nationality of persons 
who travel from the Netherlands and join an armed terrorist group as a 
priority in combating the foreign terrorist phenomenon.120 
Existing rules on revoking nationality are set out in the Law on Dutch 
Nationality.121 This law provides a number of grounds for revoking nation-
ality, some are mandatory and others lie within the discretionary powers of 
the Minister of Security and Justice. An important exception precludes rev-
ocation if this would lead to statelessness.122 This is a consequence of the 
obligations of the Netherlands as a party to the Convention on the Reduc-
tion of Statelessness.123 This Convention prohibits a State party from de-
priving a person of his or her nationality if such deprivation would render 
him stateless.124 It provides for a limited number of exceptions to this rule, 
including where a person has “conducted himself in a manner seriously 
prejudicial to the vital interests of the State.”125 In order to be able to avail 
itself of this exception, the State concerned must at the time of signature, 
ratification or accession specify its retention of the right to revoke national-
ity in such instances.126 The Netherlands did not make such a declaration. 
To address jihadism, the government introduced two bills that would 
broaden the grounds for revoking nationality. The first, which was adopted 
by parliament on March 1, 2016, revises the nationality legislation to permit 
revoking citizenship in the case of terrorist offenses.127 The explanatory 
memorandum accompanying the bill notes that the travel of young persons 
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to Syria for the purpose of terrorist training is particularly topical for the 
Netherlands.128 The bill permits the Minister of Security and Justice to re-
voke nationality on the basis of a final conviction for the crime of “provid-
ing oneself or another the opportunity, means or information or attempt-
ing to do so for the commission of a terrorist offense or an offense in the 
preparation for or facilitation of a terrorist offense, or acquiring knowledge 
or skills to that effect for oneself or another.”129 This criminal offense was 
inserted in the Criminal Code in 2010.  
In 2013, parliament adopted a motion calling on the government to 
make conviction for this crime a ground for automatic revocation of na-
tionality.130 The bill, however, does not provide for automatic revocation. 
Instead, it makes the act a discretionary decision of the Minister of Security 
and Justice. The bill does not change the existing prohibition on the revo-
cation of Dutch citizenship if such an action would result in the individual 
becoming stateless.   
The bill has raised a number of questions among commentators. One is 
whether it conforms to the treaties on revocation of nationality to which 
the Netherlands is party. In addition to the Convention on the Reduction 
of Statelessness, the Netherlands is a party to the European Convention on 
Nationality,131 which provides a list of possible grounds for revoking na-
tionality. One of these, engaging in conduct seriously prejudicial to the 
State’s vital interests,132 has been invoked by the government as applicable 
in cases provided for in the bill. According to the government, a conviction 
under Article 134a of the Criminal Code will always meet this criterion.133 
Commentators, however, question whether a blanket decision is appropri-
ate and suggest that revocation of nationality should be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.134   
A second bill provides for inclusion in the Law on Nationality the au-
thority to revoke a person’s nationality “in the interest of national securi-
ty.”135 This bill was submitted to parliament in December 2015.136 It would 
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allow the Minister of Security and Justice to revoke the nationality of a per-
son located outside the Netherlands who has joined an organization in-
volved in an international or non-international armed conflict when that 
organization is listed as a threat to national security by the Minister of Se-
curity and Justice.137  
The bill was drafted with the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters 
in Syria very much in mind. The explanatory memorandum to the bill out-
lines the threat posed by violent jihadists to national security. It refers, inter 
alia, to the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria as a destabilizing factor both re-
gionally and internationally.138 It is specifically aimed at preventing the re-
turn of violent jihadists to the Netherlands from abroad. To achieve this, 
revocation of nationality is a first step, followed by the designation of the 
person concerned as an undesirable alien.139  
One interesting feature of the proposal is the establishment of a list of 
organizations that threaten the national security of the Netherlands. The 
explanatory memorandum states that the list will be based on a selection of 
organizations placed on international terrorism lists created by the UN or 
EU.140 Not all of the organizations on these international lists will be in-
cluded, however, because not all of them pose a threat to the national secu-
rity of the Netherlands. The explanatory memorandum also makes clear 
that the facts showing that a person has joined a terrorist organization must 
be established by the minister.141 A number of sources can be used for this 
purpose, including information provided by intelligence agencies and in-
formation provided by the Public Prosecution Service. In some cases in-
formation may also be publicly available, e.g., on the Internet.   
This bill has received a number of critical questions from commenta-
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139. The Aliens Act (Wet van 23 november 2000 tot algehele herziening van de 
Vreemdelingenwet, Stb. 2000, 495 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000)) provides the possibility for 
the responsible Minister to declare someone an undesirable alien. The consequence of 
such a declaration is that the person concerned must leave the Netherlands. Article 197 of 
the Criminal Code makes the presence of a person who has been declared an undesirably 
alien a criminal offence. 
140. Parliamentary Papers II, 2015–2016, 34356, No. 3, supra note 138, at 5. 













tors and civil society organizations.142 One, which is similar to that raised 
with regard to the first bill, is whether joining a terrorist organization nec-
essarily constitutes conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the 
State in the sense of the European Convention on Nationality. A closely 
related question is whether the act of joining is in and of itself sufficient to 
conclude that the individual is a threat to the Netherland’s national securi-
ty, and therefore, whether revocation of nationality is a proportionate 
measure. Commentators have suggested an additional criterion to the act of 
joining a terrorist organization, i.e., that the person concerned must be per-
sonally involved in the commission of violent acts.143  
Other questions concern the possibility to appeal decisions to revoke 
nationality, and whether sufficient legal protection is provided. The bill cre-
ates the right to appeal to the district court when notified that the govern-
ment intends to revoke nationality. A decision by the district court can then 
be appealed to the administrative jurisdiction division of the Council of 
State, the highest administrative court of the Netherlands. One question 
raised in relation to this appeals procedure is how the person concerned 
will become aware of the government’s intention to revoke his nationality. 
If the person is unaware that the revocation proceedings have been initiat-
ed, he cannot effectively challenge them. In such a case, the bill provides 
for proprio motu review by the administrative court. The question is whether 
this meets the requirement of Article 13, ECHR that “[e]veryone whose 
rights and freedoms . . . are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority.” 
Other concerns are related to legal representation. The bill does not 
explicitly provide for legal representation of a person whose nationality is 
revoked. There is some debate about whether in order to safeguard ade-
quate legal protection, it is necessary to appoint legal counsel.144 A closely 
related question is whether, if legal counsel is assigned, he or she will be 
able to operate effectively without being in contact with the person con-
cerned.  
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Finally, an interesting point is that the Minister of Security and Justice, 
as a condition precedent to revoking a person’s nationality, must find that 
that there is an ongoing armed conflict. Such determinations are often very 
sensitive in terms of foreign policy with respect to other States. For this 
reason States are generally reluctant to make such determinations. This may 
not be an issue with regard to the situation in Syria and Iraq, but it may in 
the case of conflicts involving other States. 
 
V. REVOKING TRAVEL DOCUMENTS 
 
Revoking the nationality of foreign terrorist fighters limits their ability to 
travel. The committee established by the UN Security Council to monitor 
implementation of Resolution 1373 has underlined that “a very effective 
way to prevent the creation of foreign terrorist fighters is to ensure that 
those who attempt to travel to become foreign terrorist fighters are pre-
vented from leaving their country of origin and/or residence to travel 
abroad to conflict zones.”145 A way to achieve that result, which is less far-
reaching than revoking nationality, is to revoke travel documents, particu-
larly passports.  
In the Netherlands, a passport is normally issued by the mayor of a 
person’s city or town of residence. Existing legislation allows the Minister 
of Security and Justice to request the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations to “signal” a passport. This may be done in a number of circum-
stances. One of these is when there is a reasonable suspicion that the per-
son involved will commit acts outside of the Netherlands that pose a threat 
to the security and other vital interests of the Netherlands or of friendly 
powers.146 Once a document is signaled, the issuing authority must revoke 
the document. As of June 2015, seventy passports had been revoked 
through this signaling process. 
A person whose passport has been revoked can still obtain a national 
identity card. Although in the Netherlands the national identity card is not 
an official travel document,147 it can be used to travel to a number of coun-
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tries, including Turkey, the State that is most frequently used by foreign 
terrorist fighters entering Syria from Europe. This is illustrated by the case 
of a Dutch woman who was arrested in Turkey in April of 2015, apparently 
intending to travel to Syria from there. Her passport had been revoked, but 
she had applied for and obtained a national identity card, which she used to 
travel to Turkey.148 To address this lacuna, the government has announced 
its intention to introduce legislation that would automatically revoke both a 
person’s passport and national identity card when a national travel ban has 
been imposed on that person.149 This may raise questions concerning the 
right to leave and return to one’s country, laid down in Article 12(2) and (4) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, respectively.150 





As was stated in the introduction, this article does not present a compre-
hensive overview of the measures taken by the Netherlands to address the 
foreign terrorist fighters’ phenomenon. Given the number and wide range 
of measures taken, such a review is beyond the scope of this article. More-
over, the legal and policy framework is constantly developing, so that any 
exhaustive description would very quickly become incomplete. This article 
has focused on law enforcement in the broad sense of the term. This 
should not create the impression, however, that the approach by Nether-
lands is solely—or even primarily—a security-based approach. The U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, among others, has warned against 
such a one-sided approach, calling for stepped up measures to address the 
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broader conditions conducive to terrorism and extremist ideologies.152 The 
U.N. working group on mercenaries has stated in a report on foreign ter-
rorist fighters that “preventive approaches must be balanced with repres-
sive approaches,” including prosecutions, and “[b]lanket attempts to prose-
cute all aspiring and returning foreign fighters could have a radicalizing ef-
fect and reinforce recruitment narratives.”153  
This balance is not necessarily easy to strike. There has been some crit-
icism by commentators in the Netherlands that the criminal law framework 
is being reverted to too easily to address the threat of foreign terrorist 
fighters. These commentators argue that criminal law is increase-ingly con-
sidered as an optimum remedium, where it should be an ultimum remedium.154 
Whatever views one holds on the proper role of criminal law in combating 
terrorism, there is no doubt that the Netherlands has put in place many 
measures promoting a “soft” approach. These include, inter alia, multi-
annual consultations with imams on the government’s approach to radicali-
zation, education, discrimination and Islamophobia; appointment of a na-
tional confidential advisor to support key figures in the Muslim community 
who promote an alternative view and take a stand against jihadism; and es-
tablishment of a national advisory center to offer support to family mem-
bers and associates of radicalized individuals or jihadist travelers and assis-
tance, under strict conditions, to extremists who wish to escape the jihadist 
movement.155 
When looking at the specific measures discussed in this article, one 
conclusion that may be drawn is that they illustrate the close relationship 
between international law and domestic law in the field of counterterror-
ism. This relationship consists of different strands. The first strand is the 
implementation of international obligations in domestic law. There are 
many international instruments relating to terrorism generally and an in-
creasing number that focus specifically on foreign terrorist fighters. The 
prime example of the latter is Security Council Resolution 2178.156 The im-
plementation of these instruments often requires States to take measures in 
                                                                                                                      
152. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/28, Sept. 12, 2014, ¶¶ 36–39. 
153. Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, supra note 6, ¶ 78. 
154. See e.g., Andreas Kouwenhoven & Sheila Kamerman, “Strafrecht Misbruikt bij 
Aanpak Terrorisme,” NRC HANDELSBLAD (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nrc.nl/next/2015/ 
11/02/strafrecht-misbruikt-bij-aanpak-jihadisme-1552110. 
155. Parliamentary Papers II, 29754, No. 253, supra note 5, at 17–20. 














their domestic law, including criminalizing certain conduct. When measures 
taken on the basis of domestic implementation are brought before the 
courts, national judges may look to the international instrument “behind” 
the national law in interpreting the latter. This may be made more difficult 
by the ambiguous drafting of the international instrument concerned, as 
illustrated by the Dutch courts’ grappling with the interpretation of exclu-
sion clauses, in particular preambular paragraph 11 of the European 
Framework Decision.  
This discussion also illustrates a second strand, namely the relationship 
between international instruments dealing with terrorism on the one hand 
and IHL on the other hand. The attempts by Dutch courts to clarify this 
relationship are a welcome development. This author considers that the 
approach taken by these courts, which focuses on the distinction between 
international and non-international armed conflicts, is sound under lex lata.   
A third strand consists of limitations imposed by international law on 
measures under domestic law. Of particular importance is State respect for 
human rights obligations when taking measures domestically. As illustrated 
by the human rights concerns that have been leveled at bills introduced by 
the government relating to deprivation of nationality, measures to combat 
foreign terrorist fighters have an impact on human rights. Whether such 
measures remain within the limits of a State’s human rights obligations de-
pends, in addition to the nature of the measures concerned, on the human 
rights obligations of that specific State. For the Netherlands, the main 
point of reference is the ECHR and European Court of Human Rights ju-
risprudence. Thus far, the measures taken by the Netherlands in combating 
foreign terrorist fighters have not come before that Court. 
A final conclusion concerns cooperation. The discussion of different 
measures has underlined the need for cooperation between different actors 
within the Dutch legal system and between different Dutch governmental 
agencies and units. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is largely 
dependent on the AIVD and the Public Prosecution Service to provide the 
information necessary to freeze assets. Similarly, information provided by 
the AIVD may be the trigger for a criminal investigation and prosecution 
by the Public Prosecution Service. Cooperation between national and mu-
nicipal authorities is required for the revocation of passports.  
In the Netherlands, the National Coordinator for Combating Terror-
ism and for Security (Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veil-
igheid, NCTV) plays an important role in fostering interagency coopera-












eration is not only required at the national level, however. By definition, 
foreign terrorist fighters cross borders between States. The threat they rep-
resent can be addressed effectively only if the different States involved, 
sending States, transit States and receiving States, increase and strengthen 
their cooperation. It is the need for cooperation that appears to be the 
most important challenge in the immediate future.157   
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